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I1 
THE SCIENCES OF LIFE AND THE ETHICAL 
CODE 
ave taken it to  be a legitimate division of labor in WE the world of thought if science confines itself to  an- 
swering the question W h a t  exists? and leaves to  some other 
hands the answer to the question W h a t  is good?  or W h a t  
ought to  be? But we have also seen that when science turns 
its attention to  man, and asks what the facts are in his case, 
it is bound to find among those facts man’s valuations-his 
preferences and his conscience. W h a t  men do in fact prefer 
and approve is part  of the factual picture of the world. By 
questionnaires and statistical methods it is possible to tabu- 
late an average opinion on matters of value, or to plot a 
trend curve of moral judgments. And always men will find 
such data relevant to their own opinions on what is valuable 
or right; some will identify the average judgment with the 
normal judgment. 
This process of extracting standards from facts obviously 
leaves us without a standard to judge or to improve the 
facts. In this sense it is literally an ethically passive or idle 
attitude, and leaves custom master of the field ; while it puts 
those who would alter custom always in the wrong. I t  is a 
“realistic” attitude, one which takes the world as it finds it, 
refrains from deviating, still more from reforming, and 
makes its own adjustment to  the way men and things are. 
I t  has the natural disadvantage that custom a t  one time 
or place is not custom a t  another; hence realism delivers us 
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over to  relativity. Slavery was right among the Greeks 
because it was the custom and was also factually approved; 
even Saint Thomas was inclined to  follow Aristotle in his 
judgment on this point. But later on, the consensus wavered; 
Gallup polls of 1750 and 1800 and 1850 on this point would 
have showed increasing uncertainty. H o w  then would real- 
ism extract from the facts a standard? In  spite of ourselves 
we should have to  recognize that the facts of prevalent 
opinion still leave the question W h a t  ought to be? un- 
answered. 
Once we see this, we take the further step and say that 
no matter of fact, even of the facts of human opinion, can 
evade the further question whether it is right. No state of 
things or of thoughts is so well established that it can frown 
down the challenge, “Are you what you ought to  be?” This 
free-lance question is always in order! And it is never to 
be settled by another appeal to  the status quo. 
W e  admit the gap between ‘‘is’’ and “ought”; there is no 
escape. But is there no bridge? At  least, there are attempts, 
and from both sides of the gap. Men of science do  build 
ethical codes, which seem to  them inspired by the facts of 
the world; they cross over from “is1’ to “ought.” And there 
are theorists of value, who explain the meaning of “ought” 
in terms of what exists; they cross over in the opposite direc- 
tion. I t  may be that neither of these operations is defensible. 
But we are bound to examine them, not for  the purpose of 
finding fault with them, but for the purpose of finding 
whether they are on the trail of some important connection 
between these two sundered interests. T h a t  will be the work 
of this second lecture. 
W e  shall begin with the codes proposed by the scientists 
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or students of science. As a fact of biography, men of 
science have not alone set up codes for themselves but have 
sometimes published them and recommended them to others. 
W e  may go so f a r  as to say that every scientist has an 
ethical code which defines his attitude toward his own work. 
This  code can hardly be a scientific product, since it takes 
part  in the creation of science; but there it is, as a highly ef- 
fective and highly exacting demand. And beyond this, every 
scientist, as a man, has a code for  his own conduct of life, 
derived from some source or other, often independent of 
his science but often sustained or illustrated by his results 
as a scientific thinker. 
I t  is possible that the scientist is inconsistent in extracting 
ethical guidance from scientific fact; if so he would be show- 
ing himself human like the rest of us. But it is also possible 
that the assumptions he makes may show a connection be- 
tween fact and value which we have not so f a r  noticed. In 
either case we are bound to examine his procedures. 
I .  T H E  BIOGRAPHY O F  A SCIENTIST 
I have in mind a physiologist, a friend, who, in the in- 
terest of just this problem of science and value, was willing 
to  turn autobiographical for a half hour. H e  felt his ex- 
perience to  be representative widely of science today; and 
I think he was right on this point. As to  metaphysics, he 
professed to  be agnostic, since his scientific training had 
emphasized the importance of being able to  say “I do  not 
know.” H e  felt it possible to  say, however, as a sort of 
premiss, that he is a “representative of an evolutionarily 
successful species”; and it was evident that he was extract- 
ing from this fact of success some sort of blessing of Nature 
upon his ways of reacting (feeling and acting). But he also 
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finds in himself reactions which have nothing to do  with 
biological success, and so he confesses: 
I find myself reacting to  complex situations as a whole, and responding 
, . . in ways which a re  inexplicable on any scientific basis. I never expect 
to  understand most of the things I value most highly-the thrill of a sun- 
set, o r  a symphony, o r  the love I have for  certain persons. 
When it comes to building an ethical code, he seems to  
trust these non-scientific ways of feeling, not only for him- 
self, but for  others. H e  goes so f a r  as to  say that it is an 
empirical fact that “there is such a thing as the good life.” 
There  is an empirical contrast between the lives of Socrates, 
Christ, Lincoln, on one hand, and Nero, Napoleon, Hitler, 
on the other. H e  can surely count on a large degree of emo- 
tional assent to  this judgment; we shall have, however, to 
raise the question in passing, in what sense is this judgment 
empirical. F o r  if goodness and badness are there in the 
facts in the same sense that Nazareth and St. Helena are 
there, ethical quality might become a t  once an object of 
science. But my friend is not proposing to leave this asser- 
tion unsupported, as a pure deliverance of the facts: he 
tells why he personally hates the social system associated 
with Hitler. The re  are certain values, “human dignity and 
kindnesses,” which to  him are “the most important things 
in life” : Nazism threatens these values. And he believes 
that human history lends a certain corroboration to his per- 
sonal scale of worths. 
Is the validity of this scale, then, a matter of general 
agreement among men, or among reasonable men? Ad- 
mitting as he does that there is a t  present a world conflict 
between “two irreconcilable viewpoints,” one making the 
individual a means to  the state as end, the other making 
the state a means to  the individual as end-the fact of the 
conflict would make hazardous any appeal to  a consensus 
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of opinion. If we are called upon to invest our lives and 
properties in an attempt to destroy Hitlerism, is it  sufficient 
to point to  the physiological fact that our reactions, sanc- 
tioned by our survival hitherto, are discovered to  be hating 
reactions? 
If this is all, then other groups of men, who find that 
their reactions, also sanctioned by their survival hitherto, 
set a state-compelled order and security above liberty, with 
its attendant difficulties and uncertainties, would have a 
similar ground for the other viewpoint, and there would be 
no way to  settle matters but to  fight it out:  in the words 
of Justice Holmes, 
Between two  groups tha t  want  to  make inconsistent kinds of world I 
see no remedy except force.’ 
I detect, however, in my friend’s words a sign of dissatisfac- 
tion with his own attempt to  base a code of ethics on the 
simple physiological fact of preference, similar preferences 
among similar groups of men, for he goes on to give still 
another reason for his view: the totalitarian makes his state 
a “false god” because, as he says, it “prostitutes science” 
as well as philosophy and theology. If I may venture to 
translate this figure, it  means that a science which is not 
free to serve truth precisely as it sees it, with no concern 
whatever to  promote the good of a particular government, 
is izot science. In other words, science is so identified with 
a certain chastity of motive that if it loses this virtue it 
loses its very being. If this is true, there is a certain dia- 
lectical necessity in our condemnation of Nazism, to which 
the Nazis also must come, and we begin to  discern a logic 
in value which may rescue it in the end from the shakiness of 
factual preference. But, having knocked on this door, our 
‘Holmes-Pollock Lefterr, edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1g41), Vol. 11, p. 36. 
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scientific friend does not enter it, and we are left with what 
we feel to be an admirable personal confession built on 
extra-scientific experience. 
2. THE CODE OF FOLLOWING N A T U R E  
I wish now to  turn to  certain codes avowedly based on 
science, which are offered for general acceptance. These 
are of two general types: one type, those which, viewing 
man as embedded in Nature, call upon him to  take his 
guidance from Nature ;  the other type, those which set man 
in some contrast with the rest of Nature,  and call on him 
to assert his own distinctive values. 
T h e  first type is brought into modern vogue by the de- 
velopment of biology and the vistas of evolution which go 
with it. T h e  word “Nature” is an ancient link between 
fact and value. I n  the philosophy of Lao Tze ,  the great 
word is “Tao” ;  this mysterious symbol may be described 
as meaning the order of heaven and ear th ;  a man is said 
to have T a o  when he has this law within him, that is, to  
be right is to be natural. Wherever Nature is conceived 
as having her own laws which govern the growth of living 
things as well as the movements of the non-living, it be- 
comes a standard of rightness to live “according to  Na- 
ture”; and while, for us, it has become difficult to  see what 
is ‘‘natural” for a self-conscious and therefore artificial 
creature like man, the word “unnatural” still stands for a 
severe condemnation. When the Stoics adopted the prin- 
ciple, “Live according to  Nature,” they were doubtless think- 
ing of Nature as a living totality, in which thought as well 
as matter were present, so that the phrase “the intentions 
of Nature” has a literal meaning. F o r  us, Nature has no 
intentions; yet it is as hard for  a modern biologist as for 
Aristotle or St. Thomas to  suppress the fancy that Nature  
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has given some broad hints about what sound and healthy 
behavior is. 
Fo r  strict empirical observation the distinction of end 
and means does not exist. T h e  roots of a tree draw in and 
construct sap, which serves the nutrition of the tree: this 
is cause and effect, not means and end. Yet, as Kant long 
ago remarked, the system of processes in any organism so 
distinctly supplement one another, aid one another, and con- 
spire to the life of the whole, that  an observer can hardly 
tell what an organism is without saying that  it is an assem- 
blage of functions in which each is a means to  all the rest 
and to  the whole as ends. Three times out of four when 
a biologist turns moralist, he takes this picture of interde- 
pendence, cooperation, and totality as his model. 
Thus Professor S. J. Holmes of California writes that 
“Morali ty becomes just one phase of the adjustment of the 
organism to its conditions of existence. As a good body is 
one which runs smoothly and efficiently in the maintenance 
of its vital functions, so a good man is one whose conduct 
not only maintains his own life on an efficient plane, but 
conduces to the enhancement of the life of his social group.”l 
In  his Data of Ethics, Herbert  Spencer made the first 
whole-hearted attempt to  derive from the picture of evolu- 
tion, organic and social, a rule of conduct for  men. Arguing 
that all goodness must be good for something, instrumental 
to  some end, he attempted something fa r  more ambitious 
than to  formulate the end which human societies may aim 
a t  : he attributed to evolution itself a definable direction, 
namely, the increase of life. The  transformations within 
society, from the military to  the industrial type of rkgime, 
IS. J. Holmes, “Darwinian Ethics and its Practical Applications,” Science, 
August 11, 1939, p. 122. Quoted by Professor C. Leake in “Science Implies 
Freedom,” San Francisco, 1940. 
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are deducible from this general aim, since military activity 
is mutually destructive. This development is a t  once moral 
and inevitable, and the individual human being is urged- 
not in hortatory terms, but in purely descriptive terms as 
to  what constitutes “highly evolved conduct,” reminding 
one of Confucius’s method of conveying ethical exhorta- 
tion by telling what the Superior o r  Princely man will do- 
to fall in with the direction of Nature as shown in evolu- 
tion. 
This system and its current criticisms have been before 
the public long enough so that every student is uneasily con- 
scious that Spencer has not answered the question why our 
sympathetic accord with Nature’s direction must cease when 
the curve turns downward and the phase of Dissolution 
begins. 
But even if we were justified in forgetting dissolution 
and Nature’s ultimate indifference to  the “amount of life” 
in the universe, one can hardly refrain from wonder a t  the 
confidence with which these suggestions from organic life 
are brought forward as an adequate code of ethics, or in- 
deed as any code a t  all. 
T h e  harmony of functions within an organism is not a 
voluntary harmony, a t  least, it is not so conceived in the 
customary metaphysical conceptions of the laboratory, 
which still incline to look for reality in the direction of the 
physical nexus of events. Society differs from any possible 
organism in the relative autonomy of the units to  whom an 
ethical code might be addressed. T o  say tha t  the moral 
man is one whose activity promotes relations within society 
like those obtaining in the organism itself is simply to  say 
that men ought to accomplish freely that mutual help which, 
in the organism, Nature accomplishes unfreely. And this 
amounts to saying no more than this: that ethical conduct 
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is conduct in which the antithesis between individual interest 
and social interest is finally solved. If this were true, it 
W O U I ~  be no code, but simply a statement of the problem 
which codes have to  meet. 
And it assumes that society ought  to  be an organism, 
which is more than doubtful. For  the organic type of har- 
mony is one in which the whole is actually the supreme end, 
which is precisely what the totalitarian asserts. Such an ideal 
is more nearly realized in relatively simple societies in which 
individual self-assertion is less radical. T h e  direction of 
social evolution is toward the distinctness of individual men 
and toward an ever changing novelty of pattern in their 
impacts on one another, within a social frame which does 
not undertake to  include in its own metabolism the whole, 
or even a major part, of their activities. More  than that, 
in the more highly developed societies, the individual has 
the opportunity to  go wrong! H e  is entrusted with powers 
which, if  he uses them maliciously, may cause serious injury 
to his neighbors. H e  is allowed private property, which 
gives him an opportunity to manifest greed and inhumanity. 
Should society tighten itself up and deprive him of these 
possibilities of selfishness? Shall society take away free mo- 
tion, free use of automobiles, since these liberties make it 
possible for its members to run amok? Or shall it  take the 
line that free traffic with voluntary self-control in avoiding 
collisions is still better? T h e  whole moral quality of human 
existence depends on the circumstance that men could go 
wrong and  freely refrain from doing so, not on being cast 
into a right mould from which they cannot depart. For 
these reasons, society as a super-organism is a false ideal. 
I say this with high regard for the strong case which 
Professor R. W. Gerard has recently made, in his address 
a t  the Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration a t  Chicago.’ H e  
1R. W. Gerard, “Higher Levels of Integration,’’ Science, March 2 7 ,  1942, 
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unites in his picture the symbol of the organism and the 
direction of evolution as guides to an ethical code. H e  
points out that  
with evolutionary advance there is progressive emphasis on cooperation 
of unlike units relative to  competition between like ones . . . a step 
towards differentiation of units and their reintegration into a cooperating 
whole has always been retained-presumably because it has survival 
value. 
And he carries this principle over into the evolution of 
social forms : 
As societies develop there is an  indubitable trend towards greater  cohe- 
sion-in the so-called democracies only less than in the avowed totali- 
tar ian states, 
adding, since the apparent approval of the totalitarian di- 
rection lies on the surface of his argument, that 
Reasons for  not equating this trend with Naziism or  any other existing 
dictatorship a re  developed elsewhere. 
F o r  the individual, the mental changes which accompany 
these trends in the structure of his super-orgs are indicated 
as the enlargement of his social psyche, a growth of altru- 
ism, associated with the functioning of his cerebrum, and 
with a willingness to  be subordinated, not suppressed, ex- 
changing old freedoms for new: 
T h e  individuals a re  imperceptibly conditioned to  their social milieu . , , 
and . . . behave as they do with no feeling of coercion. . . . 
I agree that changes of this kind are going on, and that in 
many respects they are desirable, even necessary changes. 
I cannot agree that they furnish us a code. They will be 
permitted to occur-now that we are alive to their presence 
-only in so fa r  as the developed moral individual assents 
to them. T h e  developed society is not one which secures 
its existence first and then the freedom of its members; the 
developed society risks its own order and welfare to  the 
freely given loyalty of its members and accepts their free 
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improvisation of new social relationships to  a degree that 
would be fatal to  any organic over-structure. 
There  is no phase of sub-human activity which can serve 
as a safe guide for the human moral code. W e  turn there- 
fore to  those proposals which take their cue from the dif- 
ferences between man and the rest of Nature, not from the 
analogies. 
3. CODES W H I C H  P U T  M A N  IN CONTRAST W I T H  T H E  REST 
OF N A T U R E  
I t  is well to  recall that Thomas Henry  Huxley deliber- 
ately abandoned the attempt to  extract ethics from Nature. 
If men want gardens, they have a standing quarrel with 
Nature, which left to herself will pull every park and field 
back to forest. A modern society, if it is to express man’s 
preferences, has to  be likewise maintained as an artefact, 
in which a common plan and ideal replace the rule of im- 
pulse. This is what we mean by civilization. 
When Nature developed that important tool for survival 
called the mind, she purchased the possibility of intelligent 
adaptation to  unclassified situations, novel situations, and 
ultimately produced a creature not limited to a restricted 
habitat, fit to  explore the depths of the sea and the strato- 
sphere itself. But she paid a price for this versatility: that 
“mind,” taken on as a servant of the organism, assumes 
control of the whole organism; it follows its own ends, 
recognizes no other ends except its own. Nature was able 
to set traps here and there, pleasures and pains to guard 
the most dangerous passes of choice and ensure against 
speedy death by willfulness of the supposed servant. But 
even in eating, man eats to please himself, not Nature. And 
beyond these simple organic necessities all the goods of 
civilization, and ethics with it, are his game alone. 
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So Bertrand Russell, who would build an ethical scheme 
in full view of a scientific world-picture, allows Nature to  
draw the limiting outline of man’s hopes, facing fully the 
prospect of universal death which opens before the race, 
but within those limits urges us to  be free, to assume our 
due rule in that world of value where we are kings-since 
there is no one to  dictate to us above or below. But as free 
choosers of our own moral rules, he issues to  us an appeal 
to wisdom-for there are such things as foolish choices. 
T h e  wise man, he thinks, will choose the non-competitive 
goods of love and knowledge rather than the competitive 
goods of wealth and mastery. T h e  ethical law becomes a 
code of advice for  rational choosers, based on an assump- 
tion that for all men alike the non-competitive relationship 
among valuers is itself intrinsically valuable. This assump- 
tion he does not support. 
And for  the ultimate motive which must sustain the dis- 
cipline and self-restraint involved in all civilized living, M r .  
Russell has only the picture of an heroic defiance of fate, a 
gesture of self-esteem amid the lonely regions of a universe 
silently, inexorably, unconsciously closing the episode of 
man’s aspirations. 
Mr. Russell’s ethics is neither scientific nor unscientific. 
I t  is factual, in the sense that he takes human valuations as 
facts, produced in us by Nature. But these facts have the 
peculiarity of introducing a new polarity into the whole 
scene, charging all other facts with the invidious qualities 
of good and evil, better and worse. These qualities, though 
they express nothing but our own natures, have their own 
principles of structure, which it is wisdom to  recognize- 
an autonomous structure having nothing to  do with Nature. 
One might suppose that Mr. Russell is picturing man, in 
the presence of this realm of free rulership, as having 
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floated well out and beyond the control of physical law. But 
no : for  there stands his opening sentence in this discussion: 
man is a thing of Nature, not something in contrast to Na- 
ture : the laws of his action are the same laws as those which 
describe the motions of the stars and the atoms. After all, 
then, this freedom is only a pseudo-freedom : it  all lies with- 
in the sphere of causal prediction; it alters nothing in the 
procession of physical detail. And this final appeal to  the 
attitude of defiance and despair is but histrionic: for it 
lies not within our choice but in the control of iron neces- 
sity whether we pass out thus, or resentful and afraid, or 
simply weary of a hopeless fight, whose glorious achieve- 
ments by the way there are none to record, none to  celebrate, 
none to remember. 
Just this effort of Russell’s to decorate with solemnity 
the Dead End  of human striving, which he takes as scien- 
tifically fixed, shows, however, one important link between 
fact and value. If that is the end, it makes a difference in 
all values. 
W h a t  difference does it make? 
H e r e  I would like to  bring forward a more serious wit- 
ness than iVr. Russell. In his recent Giff ord Lectures, Alar2 
on h is  N a t u r e ,  Sir Charles Sherrington, the noted physi- 
ologist, represents in his last chapter that “Conflict with 
Nature’’ in which our moral problem is born. Man  alone 
surveys as a whole the process out of which he comes and 
is able to  estimate its inner suffering and cruelty: 
Standing on his planet he, its own product, harbours rebellion against 
the process which has enthroned him.’ 
At this moment his “altruism is in bud.” But there remains 
in him the “old priniordial ‘urge-to-live’ ) )  which continues 
‘Sir Charles Sherrington, M a n  o n  his Nature (New York: T h e  Macmillan 
Co.; Cambridge, Eng.: T h e  University Press, 1 9 1 1 ) ~  p. 388. 
Sciences of Life and Ethical Code 179 
that same course of conflict and self-assertion, and “life 
without ‘zest-to-live’ will assuredly perish.” Hence there 
begins within our own nature a “great antinomy,” in which 
the direction of altruism alone promises a degree of respite 
from the agony which has built the present living world. 
As to the ultimate outlook, Sir Charles seems to  find the 
race confronted with the same probable Dead End  foreseen 
by Russell. T h e  demands of truth require us not to evade 
in thought the ultimate bleakness of the human position. 
There  is no appeal beyond man for guidance o r  for help, 
since man is the summit of the intelligence of the universe, 
but this fact itself is, in Sir Charles’ view, tantamount to  
respoizsibility. Since there is no God beyond us, we must 
make common cause, and share the task of reaching good- 
ness and beauty with each other. Le t  me quote his words: 
. . . it is a situation which transforms the human spirit’s task, almost be- 
yond recognition, to  one of loftier responsibility. I t  elevates tha t  spirit to  
the position of protagonist of a virility and dignity which otherwise the 
human figure could not possess. I t  raises the lowliest human being con- 
jointly with the highest, Prometheus-like, t o  a rank of obligation and 
pathos which neither Moses in his law-giving nor Job in all his suffering 
could present, W e  have, because human, an inalienable prerogative of re- 
sponsibility which we  cannot devolve, no, not as once was  thought, even 
upon the stars. W e  can share it only with each other.’ 
Thus  to  extract an “ought” from a factual situation is 
not for Sir Charles a scientific result: it belongs to  what he 
calls “natural religion.” But quite clearly, he finds here a 
passage from fact to value; and more than this, believes 
that the value thus found will o r  should evoke the same 
ethical response in all men. 
4. WHAT ARE THESE ETHICISTS AFTER? 
I am not sure that Sir Charles means to  present us with 
one of the Dead-End pictures of the world. Perhaps he 
’Ibid., p. 404. 
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means to  leave the finale open. In  either event he, like 
Russell, tries to  induce us to forget it, as irrelevant to  the 
interim in which human lives should be happier rather than 
more miserable, and lightened by beauty rather than sordid. 
From this there will be no dissent. 
The  only trouble is that it does make a difference whether 
in the total, something is achieved, and to this both Russell 
and Sherrington would seem bound to answer no. There 
will be a time, af ter  the vanishing of human life, when the 
universe will be as if the human history had never taken 
place. 
This  seems to Sherrington not to  alter the quality of our 
satisfaction in such enjoyment as we can have. For,  as he 
says, 
Even should mind in the cataclysm of Nature  be doomed to  disappear and 
man’s mind with it, man will have had his compensation: to  have glimpsed 
a coherent world and himself as item in it. T o  have heard for a moment 
a harmony wherein he is a n0te.l 
One cannot refrain from questioning whether the world 
which brings forth man’s conscious struggle only to  pull 
aside the veil for  an instant and then quench both struggle 
and vision could appear to him as either “a coherent world” 
or a “harmony.” And if it appeared even as a momentary 
enlightenment qualified with an element of cruel mockery, 
would this result indeed deserve the name of “compensa- 
tion” ? 
I t  is here that  Nietzsche comes nearer to meeting the 
need for an ethical motive. F o r  him, there is something to  
be accomplished-the overman-the next order of being be- 
yond man. And for  the sake of this result, Nietzsche, like 
an earlier and greater prophet, promised his followers not 
pleasure but suffering, not ease but severe discipline, not 
1 Ibid., p. 401. 
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peace but a sword. “Geist,” he said, “Spirit is the life which 
cuts into its own life.” 
Now Nietzsche was not a natural scientist, yet he pro- 
fessed to take his clue from evolution. W e  might have put 
him into the first group-those whose ethics is a following 
of Nature, only, what Nietzsche saw in Nature as worth 
following was certainly not what Spencer saw, or Conklin, 
or Gerard :  it had nothing to  say about cooperation and 
harmony. H e  read into Nature an effort to  get beyond it- 
self, to  make every form that had hitherto existed raw ma- 
terial for a better form to come. 
So Nietzsche combines both types, those who follow Na- 
ture and those who set man apar t ;  because for him man 
is just the line of battle through which Nature is making 
her way toward something which no past mode of life could 
suggest, and the problems which to  us seem to  promise 
nothing but the Dead End  may for that higher being prove 
to have an outlet beyond. 
I t  is evident that Nietzsche, though he declares that God 
is dead-the God of the skies and of tender Providence-is 
injecting a living trend into the course of cosmic history. 
I t  would be idle to  describe it as a “purpose,” this upward 
drive of his-thwarted in the end by his spectre of the 
Eternal Recurrence. Yet we may say that Nietzsche’s ethic 
showed by its leap toward a prefigured accomplishment, 
that of the Superman, one essential element of a code, any 
code which can win the support of a human morale. And 
it is something, too, that  he does not feel the need to  re- 
pudiate all the harshness of Nature, nor t o  rest everything 
on an advance of sympathy: creatorship is, for him, the an- 
swer to both sympathy and struggle, containing something 
of both-involving a transformed sympathy and forgive- 
ness : 
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W h a t  thou hast done to  me, I forgive; 
But  wha t  thou hast done to thyself, how can I forgive t h a t ?  
T h e  will of all great love is-the beloved to create. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
I t  is the destiny of such wild genius as that of Nietzsche 
to  tell no well-rounded truth, but to strike out here and 
there forgotten elements of rounded truth. 
All in all, we gain from these codes that would follow 
Nature and from those that would cast off from Nature 
an impression that Nature says nothing which a scientifically 
dispassionate ear can take as a reliable ethical cue. There  
is something of prejudice in the listener which selects from 
a conflicting variety of suggestions among the facts those 
which it prefers to  hear. But I am not sure that this process 
is either purely arbitrary or purely subjective, if what one 
hears is a resonance. For science alone, Nature has no in- 
tention and no ethical admonition: for a more intuitive per- 
ception, the total fact of Nature does seem to convey a dim 
“ought”-a summons to  man to  be himself, t o  detach him- 
self from retrospective organic analogies, and equally to 
discount the laming prospect of the Dead End. I t  is as 
though Nature were saying, “If you could know me as I 
am, you would find in me something not alone to  wonder 
at, but something also to  be loyal to.” This is not much, 
but it leaves hope of a passage from fact to  value. We 
shall now take up the enquiry from the other end. 
5 .  CAN “OUGHT” BE DEFINED? 
None of the codes we have examined can defend them- 
selves against skeptical analysis, and yet I think we should 
be dupes of our own skepticism if we did not recognize in 
all these efforts a sound instinct to join the “ought” in some 
way to  what is. W e  may begin a tunnel from the other side 
of the hill, by analyzing the meaning of the term “ought,” 
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in order to  see whether the idea of “ought” will show some 
relation to what is. 
Like the term “value,” the term “ought” may well put 
up a claim to be indefinable. W e  have indeed a genus for 
it, the genus “value”: but if we then attempt to say what 
differentiates it from other values, we can only light upon 
the “ethical” o r  “moral,” which in turn relates to what we 
ought to do, and we complete the latent circle. 
This  indefinable character appears in our inability to  
explain an “ought” to  anybody-man, child, or dog. A dog 
may be taught that he is not to  put his paws on the table; 
and the “must not” in this case has first the purely prag- 
matic meaning that he will be punished if he does. If he is 
a dog of character he seems to get somewhat beyond that 
point: it is not that his act is punished, but that it is dis- 
approved, which is quite different. And he may even reach 
the point of seeing that it is not alone factually disapproved 
-for unknown reasons-but j i is t ly  disapproved, which is 
surely a great stride into the center of the moral mystery! 
If he ever arrives a t  a dim feeling that “this sort of thing 
is not done,” that well-conducted dogs do  not do  it, he comes 
close to the edge of the moral “ought” ! Whether any dog 
reaches this point, we shall never know. 
T h e  child follows the same course, but he arrives: he 
sees eventually why certain types of behavior are approved 
o r  disapproved; then he understands and can use the word 
“ought.” But it is never explained to  him : he has to recreate 
its meaning from his own inner resources. 
T h e  difficulty in defining ultimate terms of this sort is 
that we must either define them in terms of what they are 
or in terms of what they are not. To define them in terms 
of what they are is circular. To  define them in terms of 
what they are not is false. For example, if we try to  define 
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the mind, we can define it in terms of mental states, which 
is circular, or in terms of behavior, which is false. If we 
insist on defining such terms we seem to  be put to a choice 
between being inane or false. Which do  you prefer? Most  
of the interesting novelties in recent philosophy and logic 
are the result of preferring the false definition to  the fruit- 
less one. T h e  mind is certainly not behavior, but it is in the 
context of behavior, so that with an initial deed of violence 
the definer does succeed in finding something useful about  
the mind. Likewise all pragmatic, instrumental, and opera- 
tional definitions are false : a concept does certainly not 
mean its consequences, nor what we do with it-otherwise 
the word “it” has no referent. But such definitions need only 
a slight turn to become true and fruitful as the circular defi- 
nitions never can be, and we can avoid the element of falsity 
by being clear that we are not defining by essence, but by 
context. Accordingly, we shall not undertake to  say what 
“ought” is, but point out certain situations in which its use 
is appropriate. 
One common situation of this sort is that of pointing 
out to someone a good thing which “he ought not to  miss.” 
Thus  : 
“Here  is a good play-you ought to  see it.” 
“Jones is a competent man-you ought to consider him 
for your job.” 
“There is a fine highway, shorter and better-you ought 
to  go that way.” 
In  this use of the word there is a close agreement between 
prudence and morality, though still a difference. In terms 
of ordinary prudence, Smith wants to take the shorter and 
better highway. T h e  word “ought” indicates that  there is 
some hesitation, or habit, or lethargy to  be overcome; and 
a man owes it t o  his total conception of a good life to  make 
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the effort to include in it the better rather than the easier 
course : 
“Don’t be stodgy: you ought to get up and see the sun- 
rise.” 
“Ought” acquires a more distinctly ethical meaning when 
it contains some reference to  what is the better course for  
others than oneself, as in this context: 
“Here  is a chap who needs your advice; you ought t o  
find some time for him.” 
In both sets of cases there is a choice to be made be- 
tween courses having unequal value. ( I t  is assumed that  
this inequality is recognized both by the person who says 
“I ought” and by the one who says “you ought”: unless 
such value-contrasts were in the field of common knowledge, 
any one would hesitate to  say “you ought” to  anybody else, 
and a large segment of human intercourse would fall to  the 
ground!) T h e  word “ought” refers to  a demand-an in- 
tangible pressure-to act for  the better rather than for  
the good. 
Almost we are tempted to  define the “ought” as a strain- 
function in a field of values-a force “constraining” us to- 
ward the better. But this would imply that we are being 
automatically wafted along toward the “right” choice ; 
whereas it is par t  of the meaning of “ought” that  the mov- 
ing is all our own, and that  we may very easily neglect the 
better for the good. 
W e  must consider the “ought” rather as an indication 
than as a force, an indication weighted with advice or  with 
admonition if it comes from a social environment, but other- 
wise weighted only with one’s own concern for doing the 
better job, a sort of generalized love of workmanship. W e  
might then represent the general situation in which the 
“ought” appears as follows : 
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ou~s* T h e  better 
<?’he good 
T h e  specifically ethical form of the “ought” might be repre- 
sented : 
cttq T h e  better, as affecting another within my 
T h e  good, as affecting another (o r  the neu- 
But there is a third use of the term. W e  have already 
mentioned the easy assumption we make that anyone can 
tell anyone else what he ought to  do. T h e  surprising thing 
is, not that this assumption fails from time to  time, but that 
it works so well: family life would be impossible without 
it. But what happens when it fails? Suppose I say to  you: 
“Good play-you ought to see it,” and you rejoin “I don’t 
care for plays.” I am abruptly reminded that my confident 
“ought” was assuming that a good play had a settled ob- 
jective value. When you remind me that this value is rela- 
tive to  the valuer, and that i f  you don’t care for plays there 
is nothing I can d o  about it, I am baffled for a moment; but 
I may come back with another “ought”-“You ought t o  
care for good plays!” H e r e  one sets up a value as inde- 
pendent of my factual valuation, and addresses an “ought” 
not to  my activities but to my valuations themselves! 
T h e  most disturbing and deep-striking “ought” in the 
world is that  I ought to  value things a t  their true worth. 
This involves that apparently hopeless demand, that I 
should care for some things that I do  not care for, and vice 
versa: as-to return to  our fundamental example-that I 
should love my neighbor when in fact I do  not love him; 
nevertheless it is a demand which we are constantly acknowl- 
edging and attempting to  meet. F o r  it is always a source 
of shame-though we brave it out-if we have to admit that  
’< field of free action. 
trality of inaction). 
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we do  not appreciate a certain type of quality in the world, 
of which a good play may be taken as an example. Nothing 
is so disturbing in dealing with children as the suspicion that 
little Johnny cannot perceive the moral turpitude of a lie! 
-nothing so everlasting as the hope that someday he will 
change his valuations. H e  usually does. And thus he illus- 
trates the reality of a value independent of factual valua- 
tions, which may hold an “ought” over them1 “You ought 
to find lying hateful.” 
Even so, this “ought” also is valid for me only because 
I can recognize it and attain it. Music ought to be enjoyed; 
but the deaf person has no moral duty to  become an enjoyer 
of music. In every form, the “ought” must have its rootage 
in the actual, including those possibilities of the human self 
which are actual possibilities. 
Wi th  this understanding, we may now define what we can 
mean by an “absolute” ought. I t  is based precisely on the 
fact that we discover relativity in ourselves, and that we d o  
not wholly approve of it. T h e  absolute ought applies to 
our desire, and our capacity, to  alter our desires in such 
a way as to  escape from the relativity of purely factual likes 
and dislikes. I t  means that every “ought” based on prima 
facie judgments of good and better alternatives is subject 
to  revision, so f a r  as those judgments are relative. Every 
actual preference is subject to criticism. Hence any attempt 
to  find moral o r  other norms of judgment by statistical 
methods is a t  best an approximation; a t  worst, a house built 
on sand. I t  ignores the most important of all facts in the 
premisses, the desire of every mind to get beyond its own 
shifty ethical impressions based on the wishes one may find 
in oneself on that morning when the questionnaire comes 
around. 
This  absolute ought, we may represent as follows: 
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o.I~*T Right desire 
(Actual desire 
T o  summarize our discussion so f a r :  
W h e n  the  existence of something better in the world depends on efforts 
which I can make (and which I alone can make) ,  I “ought” to make 
those efforts.’ And this formula holds good when the something better 
is a better s ta te  of my own desires. 
T h e  facts within which we have found the “ought” op- 
erating are not neutral facts: they are facts already loaded 
with quality and comparable as “better” and “less good.” 
T o  this extent they depart from scientifically usable data : 
there are no physical measurements on the better-worse 
scale. They  are none the less facts, though they involve a 
factor of quality. This is the point which Dr. Arnold Brecht 
makes in his paper on “The  Myth  of ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ ”2- 
f a r  and away the best analysis of these concepts in their 
legal bearing tha t  I have yet found. 
There  is, however, a simpler situation, purely factual, in 
which the “ought” comes into operation, that is, when any 
self finds among his objects another self. Immediately there 
is an obligation of some sort:  I cannot treat that  object as 
I treat a piece of furniture-his presence constitutes an 
“ought.” I propose to sell my farm:  but I remember that 
my farmer depends on me for  his course of life-immedi- 
ately I am less free. If you ask what it is that I ought to 
do about this other person, there is no specific answer except 
in terms that suggest truth-telling: I must treat him as what 
he is. If he is a sensitive thing I cannot treat him as if he 
were a log. If he has reason and can manage himself, I 
must deal with him by conversation, not by manhandling. 
‘This might be called a functional definition, though of a new pattern. 
It means looking for the function of a term within a given situation, not for 
its “effects” outside of its situation. I t  means finding the constant or invari- 
ant element in a variety of such situations, actual not verbal. 
2Harvard Law Review,  Vol. 51, 1941, pp. 811-831. 
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It is much like another obligation which seems to spring 
directly from fact, that  of making a true report. T h e  facts 
-all facts-put a spell on m e :  I must remember them as 
they were, and I must speak of them as they were. There 
is an appeal to  veracity in one’s most literal relation to  the 
most literal of facts, which is inseparable from one’s self- 
consciousness and from one’s personal identity. Falsify 
your story and you falsify yourself. 
Put it this way: I am under a very primitive obligation 
to  treat my world of experience as a world of real objects, 
not a world of private dreams; and because it is such, I 
cannot have it just as I would like to imagine it. I must 
respect it, just as it offers itself to  me. Here  we come very 
close to  a foundation stone of the scientist’s own creed. If 
we are right, we need nothing but ourself and an object t o  
have an “ought.” 
But one may still ask, why am I under any obligation to  
treat  an experience as a sign of an object? Why am I under 
a duty to  think instead of letting impression follow impres- 
sion, to  go through all the labor of building a consistent 
theory of this chaotic stream of materials in consciousness? 
T h e  answer lies in putting our last two observations to- 
gether. T o  tell myself the truth about things, and to  recog- 
nize among these things some that are other persons, are  
bound up together. If I live a life of impressions I have 
neither objects nor companions. And a life of impressions 
would indeed be devoid of duty: there would be no “ought” 
in a pure stream of consciousness. But if there are  com- 
panions to be had, I ought to have them! And if I have 
them, my world must become a common world. 
W e  come thus upon an interesting result: that  the tug 
of “ought” never comes solely from the “something better” 
as an abstract possible achievement; it comes from an in- 
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terest on the part  of soine other mind than our own in what 
we d o  o r  desire. If any man could be truly and absolutely 
solitary, there would be for him no “ought”: his better and 
worse would remain, but they would be matters of prudence, 
not of duty. If the last man in the world, just before its 
final destruction, were a chemist, and if that chemist were 
a t  work on an experiment which would possibly throw open 
to  him the last secret of atomic structure, I imagine he would 
go ahead and finish the experiment. H e  would do it not 
as a duty, but for the sheer exultation of knowledge. But 
I am ready to  wager, even if he were a British chemist, that 
he would not dress for dinner-not unless he felt that there 
were after all some other mind in the universe, as it were 
looking on! 
T h a t  suspicion of residual mentality is hard to dispel. 
Around all our doings there hangs this fringe-conception : 
the world expects something of us, the world somehow ex- 
pects every man to  do  his duty. This  sense of an undefined 
outer concern in what we decide is very primitive, must, I 
think, be a part  of the infantile equipment of awareness; 
for after all it is the infant and not we who has to  build up 
its world of impressions into a shared world, to  regard 
its space as a space in common with the rest of us, and the 
events which occur to  it as phases of events which belong 
to  the history of a community of persons. I t  is but a farther 
stage of the same awareness when human beings feel the 
call of the job as having a claim on them apart  from their 
immediate inclination, and gives them a pride in workman- 
ship, and an impulse to  do  in the way of perfection what no 
man could require of them. I t  belongs to  this same aware- 
ness to  conceive that truth has something inherently impor- 
tant about i t ;  not only is truth for one the truth for every- 
body, but what is true remains true-so f a r  as it is true- 
forever, whether we are there to  know it o r  not. 
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I think that the “ought” can be found in the very sim- 
plest factual situation, for there is none such that does not 
make some appeal to  our will. But I think its most radical 
and satisfactory definition is found in the universal human 
situation, one that never comes nor goes because it is always 
there, the self on one side, the world on the other, and on 
both sides an attitude of expectancy! 
T h a t  element of expectancy, t o  which “I ought’’ is a re- 
sponse, would be hard to demonstrate. I t  would be still 
harder to refute, if it happened to  be true. And the scientist 
is one of the men who acts as i f  it were true. H e  acts as 
if there were an “ought” in the call to  know, and as if the 
“ought” were there first ! 
6. IS FREEDOM AMONG THE FACTS? 
Our  analysis of the factual circumstances belonging to  
an  “ought” appears t o  include the fact of freedom of choice. 
T h e  whole point of an ethical code or injunction is lost un- 
less it is possible for the hearer to heed or not to  heed. There  
is no exception to  this principle when it is a scientist who 
uses the “ought”: he also assumes that his hearer is free. 
Sometimes he is bothered by the contrast between this as- 
sumption and the working-hypothesis of his laboratory that 
all phenomena are determined. As a rule, however, he is 
no more bothered than was Spinoza, whose great book on 
Ethics, teaching the strictest rule of necessity in all things, 
ends with a magnificent exhortation under the head of 
‘‘Human Freedom,” to  achieve those excellent things which 
are “as difficult as they are rare.” 
Herber t  Spencer is another example of the same lofty 
inconsistency, if it  is such. In  fact there are so many thinkers 
who are both determinists and also moralists that  one begins 
to  suspect something wrong in the insistence on freedom. 
Or is there something wrong in the insistence on determin- 
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ism-except as a principle of method? T h e  proposition 
that  everything happens according to  an absolutely fixed 
mathematical relationship to prior events can never be 
proved. T h a t  is one reason we get so hot about i t :  it is a 
proposition that needs protection. 
I n  my view the question is an important one, and despite 
its antiquity it is capable of settlement. I ts  solution will 
remove one of the chief impediments in the relations be- 
tween science and the world of values. F o r  the present let 
me simply indicate how definitely freedom is required if 
the word “ought” is to  have any sense. And let me come 
at  it by way of another biography-which up to  a certain 
point was a scientific one-my own. 
In  my younger days I had the ful l  joy of an enthusiastic 
discipleship ; I was fully convinced by Herbert  Spencer’s 
system of philosophy. Interest in Spencer’s world-view 
chimed in very well with my active tastes which were turn- 
ing toward engineering. I t  was in pursuit of these interests 
that I went to  college a t  Ames, Iowa, working a t  mathe- 
matics, and in the laboratories of physics and chemistry. 
Perhaps I might have been called in these days a budding 
scientist : it was certainly not a bud that ever blossomed, 
but a comradely spirit is left for  the labors of the work- 
shop, and a kindly feeling for  the smells of chemical and 
biological laboratories. 
During all this time, happy in its positive activities, there 
was an undercurrent of desolation. I remained a devout 
adherent of Spencer’s cosmological views. T h a t  belief was 
certainly no result of wishful thinking: I should have liked 
not to  believe it. But it was convincing; its power lay in 
the continuity of interpretation, and the unifying of vast 
ranges of phenomena throughout the universe. The  items 
which most required my reluctant assent were these : 
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( a )  T h e  periphery of the universe dropped off. The re  
could be no other world as a supplement to  this one. T h e  
story of Nature was the whole story of the universe. 
(b )  M a n  is an animal, with some notable points of su- 
periority in the scale of evolution, as measured by integra- 
tion and differentiation. But he dies as the animal dies, and 
the race of man will be involved in dissolution, with the rest 
of life in this region of the universe. 
(c) There  is no genuine freedom. 
I did not a t  that  time draw the consequence that nothing 
has any meaning a t  all-since if the whole has no meaning, 
the parts cannot preserve significance-I was ready to  ac- 
cept the evolutionary substitute, the direction of cosmic 
change (o r  one direction of the rhythm of change) as indi- 
cation of a certain value-scale embedded in Nature. Spencer 
had succeeded in investing the universe with one magnificent 
certitude : that there is an impenetrable mystery a t  the heart 
of things, an Unknowable. And while the presence of T h e  
Unknowable in no  way altered the grim fate of man, it 
left open the imaginary possibility that there could be an 
Unknowable Meaning in the whole affair. 
During the course of my studies in Ames, various things 
occurred to  ja r  that picture. One was an introduction to  a 
new book on psychology. This was in 1895. T h e  author 
was William James. I had never heard of him. T h e  li- 
brarian told me the book was well spoken of. 
It is hard to  analyze the nature of the j a r  which my fas- 
cinated reading of James administered to  the dominion of 
Herber t  Spencer. I do  not remember any particular thing 
I learned from that reading; but it brought me a great sense 
of relief. It was evident that  James had a scientific con- 
science: he was looking a t  the mind, just as Spencer was, 
as a thing of Nature. But he was telling more truth 
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the mind than Spencer did: he was devoid of the vanity of 
supposing himself fully on top of his object, having it finally 
explained. If the mind was too much for  him a t  any point, 
he admitted it. T h e  scientific problem of psychology gained 
some of the joy of good sportsmanship-the fish had a 
chance. And James seemed to  enjoy the twofold r6le of the 
psychologist in that sport, that of being both the angler 
and the fish a t  the same time! 
T h e  experience was not one of being emancipated from 
science; t o  go back on science was a logical impossibility. 
But I did feel that  the weight of an unnecessary negation 
had been lifted. Spencer had negated the right to  enquire 
beyond what science in its positive aspect could show; science 
and knowledge were coextensive : the rest was unknowable. 
This is a claim which science does not make. I t  appears to  
support it by the general argument of displacement; where 
the scientific explanation is either given o r  to  be hoped for, 
no other can be allowed. T h e  principle of parsimony acted 
as a restraint upon speculative enquiry. James showed me 
the illegitimacy of that damp,  and especially as it related 
to one very crucial matter, the problem of freedom. 
T h e  merits of that problem will concern us in the next 
lecture. For the present, I raise only this question ad hom- 
i n e m :  E7hy i s  determinism depressing? 
There are some who have reached the point of denying 
that it is depressing. I think I see what they mean. They  
mean that it is not depressing to  be a cog in a great machine. 
This is particularly the case if the great machine is in some 
sense a decent or respectable machine, not a mere heartless 
monster. Spinoza found i t  elevating to  be lifted into the 
atmosphere of eternity by contemplating the sublime neces- 
sities of a universe in which the most perfect necessarily 
exists. So have many mystics felt it elevating to  be admitted 
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to participation, even to absorption and obliteration, in the 
life of the infinite and one. So has many a great man found 
it elevating to  be a helpless instrument of Destiny. 
I t  is not depressing to  be a cog: it is not depressing to  
be insignificant. W h a t  is depressing is to be only a cog, an 
atom without spontaneity of its own, without any contribu- 
tion hailing from oneself. So I leave this question, Why  
is determinism depressing? 
